Abstract. One prevalent assumption in queueing theory is that the number of servers in a queueing model is deterministic. However, randomness in the number of available servers often arises in practice, e.g., in virtual call centers where agents are allowed to set their own schedules. In this paper, we study the problems of stang and controlling queueing systems with an uncertain number of servers and impatient customers. Because randomness in the number of servers creates congestion in the system, the customer abandonment distribution plays an important role. We characterize how it aects both the optimal stang policy and the cost incurred by the manager. Because of that strong dependence on the abandonment distribution, it is natural to investigate ways of controlling customer abandonment behavior so as to mitigate that cost. Here, we propose doing so by making delay announcements in the system. We characterise how the manager may use three controls in her toolbox, stang, compensation, and the announcements, to eectively control her system. We show that despite jointly optimizing the usage of those three controls, it may be cost eective for the manager to understa, oversta, or match supply and demand in any given shift.
Introduction
There is a broad literature in queueing theory which studies the problems of stang and controlling large-scale service systems; e.g., for surveys of applications in call-center management, see Gans et al. (2003) and Ak³in et al. (2007) . Much of that body of research formulates recommendations based on queueing models with several realistic features, such as time-varying parameters and nonstandard network structures. However, one prevalent assumption in those models is that the number of servers is deterministic. As such, the realized stang level in any given time period is assumed to be equal to the planned stang level for that period. In contrast, this paper studies optimal stang and control decisions in queueing systems with a random number of servers instead.
Uncertainty in the number of available agents arises in many novel work arrangements. Virtual call centers, such as Liveops (liveops.com) or Arise (arise.com) hire work-from-home agents who are free to set their own schedules, often at very short time notice. Amazon Flex (ex.amazon.com) relies on independent contractors to deliver Amazon Prime Now packages, which have a short delivery deadline, usually 1-2 hours. Those delivery workers enjoy the exibility of setting their preferred delivery times. Ride-sharing services, such as Uber (Uber.com) or Lyft (lyft.com), also allow their drivers to self-schedule. They use surge pricing (Uber 2015) to ensure the participation of a sucient number of drivers in dierent time periods. Uncertainty in the number of agents also arises in traditional work environments when there is signicant non-adherence to planned schedules. For example, it is well known that nurse absenteeism is a considerable problem in healthcare settings (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008 , BBC 2015 . As a result, the actual number of available nurses, in a given shift, is uncertain. Agent absenteeism also remains one of the leading causes of poor customer service levels in brick-and-mortar call centers (TalkDesk 2014) . While each of those settings poses unique operational challenges, agents may be viewed as being strategic in each. That is, they are decision makers who choose whether or not to be available for work in a given shift based on their individual preferences or availabilities. We study the operational management of such systems.
Framework. We assume that there are k working shifts, and that agents have inherent, heterogenous, availabilities or preferences for dierent shifts. We assume that there is a stang cost c j per server, depending on the shift j. In a rst stage, the system manager decides on the total stang level, n. Each agent in the pool of size n has a xed probability, r j , of showing up to work in the second stage. The show-up probability r j depends on both the personal preferences of agents and the compensation oered in shift j: An agent shows up to work in a shift if her (random) opportunity cost is less than or equal to the compensation oered for that shift. Customers are assumed to be both impatient and delay sensitive, as is usually the case in practice.
A long-term stang decision. Virtual call-center platforms, such as Arise or LiveOps, routinely provide training services to agents before matching them with client companies. These training periods typically last a few weeks (up to 10 weeks) 1 . With ride-sharing platforms, such as Uber or Lyft, training and background checks also require advance planning, and typically last around 2 weeks 2 . Thus, stang decisions in systems with self-scheduling agents cannot, usually, be made on the y. Since the agent population is both remote and large, up to hundreds of agents, system managers cannot simply solicit their agents' scheduling preferences ahead of time. For example, hiring decisions in virtual call centers often do not even involve a face-to-face interview 3 .
To mimic such practical challenges, we rst consider a setting where the manager must decide on n in advance by relying on historical estimates of r j . The manager may obtain these, e.g., by analyzing human resources data in her rm. For example, based on analyzing that data, she may know that work-from-home parents usually prefer morning shifts while children are at school; however, she would not know whether any specic work-from-home parent will be available for a particular shift. We determine n that minimizes the expected total system cost, which is the sum of all stang and customer-related (waiting and abandonment) costs, i.e., our focus is on ensuring a suciently high quality of service to customers; this is usually a major concern in service systems.
Since the stang problem in our general context is not amenable to exact analysis, we determine optimal stang levels by solving its uid approximation.
To quantify the impact of self-scheduling, we consider as benchmark a system where it is optimal, in the absence of self-scheduling, to match the supply (service) and demand (arrival) rates in each shift. Then, there is no congestion in the system, at uid scale, and customer impatience does not play any role. When servers self-schedule, the resulting uncertainty in the numbers of 1 http://www.ariseworkfromhome.com/faq/agent-questions/ 2 http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-you-earn-as-an-uber-driver-2014-6?IR=T 3 http://workathomemoms.about.com/od/workathomecareers/p/callcenterprofi.htm servers creates congestion in understaed shifts. Because of that congestion, the specic customer abandonment distribution now plays an important role.
Short-term controls. We assume that the manager may control the compensation that she oers her agents, and investigate how to optimize this control along with the stang decision. Indeed, controlling agents through compensation is the rationale behind surge pricing in ride-sharing platforms (Uber 2017): By increasing (decreasing) compensation in a given shift, more (less) agents should be willing to participate , Cachon et al. 2016 , Riquelme et al. 2016 .
However, there is also a need to consider alternative tools, besides compensation and stang, to control the system. First, the manager may be restricted in how much and how often she can modify compensation. This is certainty the case in virtual call centers because of market transparency and erce competition between providers. Also, in virtual call centers, compensations are often set in advance by client companies rather than by the virtual call-center platform itself. In this case, the responsibility of the platform is to sta and train agents, and act as an intermediary between client companies and their agents 4 5 . Second, while pricing inuences agents, it cannot always be used to inuence the behaviour of customers, e.g., in service-oriented virtual call centers; there is therefore a need to consider other customer-side controls. Third, there is considerable concern about the extent to which pricing should be used as a control in on-demand service platforms, because of extreme and frequent uctuations. As was noted in Taylor (2017) , most on-demand service platforms avoid realtime pricing because of customer resistance to it. As a result, there are numerous calls to consider alternatives (Harvard Business Review 2015) . We propose one such alternative in this paper.
Given that customer impatience plays an important role, it is natural to think of ways of controlling customer abandonment behavior so as to alleviate the cost of self scheduling. Here, we propose doing so by communicating to customers information about upcoming delays, in the form of delay announcements. Indeed, delay announcements are known to impact customer abandonment behavior in practice (Mandelbaum and Zeltyn 2013 , Aksin et al. 2016 , Yu et al. 2016 . When customers respond to the announcements, their behavior alters the performance in the system which, in turn, aects the future announcements given. Therefore, studying customer response requires an equilibrium analysis i.e., one where announced and experienced delays coin-4 http://www.ariseworkfromhome.com/faq/agent-questions/ 5 http://join.liveops.com/sales-independent-contractor-better-than-work-from-home-jobs cide in the uid approximation. Communicating announcements allows the manager to alleviate congestion in understaed shifts, and may also be seen as an alternative to restricting the freedom of agents by capping their access in overstaed shifts . Since restricting agent exibility through caps is typically a cause of agent complaint 6 , or may not be possible in practice (e.g., it would be easy to send nurses home if they do show up, or to limit the number of Uber drivers that ock to a certain area), it is useful to consider alternatives.
In this paper, we study eective ways of managing service platforms with self-scheduling agents where the manager has three controls in her toolbox: (i) the stang level, (ii) the announcements, and (iii) the compensation. For completeness, we consider the optimization of such controls individually (x the other two), pairwise (x only one), and jointly, because the time scales at which those decisions are made in practice may vary depending on context. When the agent pool size is xed, the announcements and the compensation may be considered to be short-term controls.
Shortly before a given shift, the manager may have at her disposal updated or revised arrival-rate forecasts which are based on some new information, e.g., for ride-sharing services, a concert may have just ended in some region, creating a surge in customer demand for Uber cars. Then, the manager would optimize her compensation and announcement decisions, for that shift, based on those updated arrival rates; we consider this joint optimization problem in 6.2.
Contributions. In this paper, we make the following contributions.
• For a rigorous treatment, we prove the asymptotic (for large arrival rates) accuracy of our uid approximation to the system with a binomially distributed number of servers and exponential times to abandon. The binomial distribution arises when agents make independent decisions, each with probability r j , to be available in shift j.
• We characterize the role that customer impatience plays in on-demand service platforms by deriving various stochastic-order relations between dierent customer abandonment distributions and characterizing how those relations impact the system's cost (extending part of the analysis in who do not explicitly study the impact on cost and Whitt (2006b) who focuses on a single-shift setting).
6 https://www.glassdoor.co.uk/Reviews/Employee-Review-Arise-RVW9860651.htm
• We determine the optimal long-term stang policy: We nd that it is optimal to either match the supply and demand rates in one of the shifts, thus overstang or understang the remaining shifts, or to not match the supply and demand rates in any of the shifts, depending on whether the abandonment distribution has a non-decreasing (former) or decreasing (latter) hazard rate. This goes against conventional wisdom in workforce management which supports optimizing controls in order to match supply with customer demand 7 .
• We analyze the system with announcements and a self-scheduling capacity across multiple shifts (extending part of the analysis in Armony et al. (2009) who focus on a single shift).
Analyzing the system with multiple shifts is not straightforward: Because of self-scheduling, there are dierent stang levels in dierent shifts, leading to dierent equilibrium announcements and abandonment distributions, depending on the shift. We derive a condition under which the announcements lead to a decrease in the cost of self-scheduling, across all shifts. In the same spirit as Huang et al. (2017) , we also position the announcements more generally in a broader context of operational decision-making in service systems: We solve a joint stang and announcement problem and show that a manager that will be using announcements at a later stage may decide on a dierent initial stang level in the rst stage.
We formulate the following managerial insights based on optimizing the three controls:
• For a xed agent pool size, the manager should vary compensation to either incite enough agents to participate (i.e., match demand), or intentionally incite a smaller or larger supply of agents than the incoming demand. This suggests e.g., that surge pricing need not always be used to match supply and demand, which is the guiding principle in managing on-demand service platforms (The Economist 2016).
• By using the announcements, the manager can alleviate costs by altering customer abandonment behavior in understaed periods. However, if the announcements are suciently eective in reducing customer-related costs, then the manager has less incentive to oer high pay to her agents to induce their participation; in other words, agents are worse o because of the announcements.
7 http://searchcrm.techtarget.com/tip/Using-workforce-management-software-effectively-in-contact-centers
• When optimizing all three controls, the value of the minimum wage that the manager has to pay her agents plays a major role. To characterize that role, as we do here, is especially important in light of the current debate about the necessity to oer minimum wage to agents in on-demand service platforms 8 . If the minimum wage is suciently low, then the manager uses only the compensation and stang controls, but does not resort to the announcements:
She eliminates all congestion in the system by paying compensation which may be strictly higher than the minimum wage. If the minimum wage is high, then the manager pays that wage in all shifts and uses the announcements to alleviate congestion in understaed periods.
Organization. Here is how this paper is organized. In 2, we review the relevant literature. In 3, we describe our modelling framework and the system manager's problem. In 4, we formulate stang recommendations with self-scheduling agents. In 5, we study the problem with delay announcements. In 6, we investigate the compensation optimization problem, and the joint optimization of all controls. In 7, we establish the asymptotic accuracy of the uid approximation with a binomial number of servers, and in 8, we draw conclusions. We relegate all proofs to the appendix, and present some additional related material in an online supplement.
Related Literature
Our modelling approach is close to the stream of literature initiated by Harrison and Zeevi (2005) which addresses the question of capacity planning under parameter uncertainty. Our paper is also related to the extensive literature analyzing asymptotics of many-server queueing systems with impatient customers (Garnett et al. 2002 , Whitt 2004 , 2006a , and to the large literature on optimal stang decisions in service systems (Maglaras and Zeevi 2003 , Borst et al. 2004 , Bassamboo et al. 2005 , 2006 ; for other references, see Gans et al. (2003) and Ak³in et al. (2007) . However, none of those papers considers a random number of servers. Atar (2008) derives a diusion limit for the number of customers with a random number of servers and random service rates. However, the stang question is not addressed there.
8 http://uk.businessinsider.com/british-uber-drivers-entitled-to-minimum-wage-holiday-pay-lodon-tribunal-rules-2 Our paper is also related to the literature which considers a random arrival rate instead of a random number of servers (Aldor-Noiman et al. 2009 , Jongbloed and Koole 2001 , Steckley et al. 2005 . rely on a stochastic-uid approximation to determine optimal stang levels in many-server queues with random arrival rates, and Whitt (2006b) relies on a uid approximation to systems with with an uncertain arrival rate, an uncertain number of servers, and a single shift (our focus here is on stang multiple shifts instead, and on making delay announcements in that setting). It is important to acknowledge that the uid approximations for systems with random arrival rates or with a random number of servers are equivalent. However, the optimization and control problems that we study in this paper (jointly over both compensation and delay announcements) are especially relevant to a system with a random number of servers, and are not covered by existing results on queues with a random arrival rate. To capture the distinction between those two types of randomness, in number of servers versus in arrivals rates, it is necessary to go beyond the uid approximation, as we do in a follow-up paper, Dong and Ibrahim (2017) .
There is a body of research within the queueing games literature which considers strategic servers that may select their service rates Harker 2002, Cachon and Zhang 2007) . However, such papers do not consider stang decisions, and the maximum number of servers considered is two. Recent exceptions are Gopalakrishnan et al. (2016) and Zhan and Ward (2016) . Our work is related to papers on nurse stang with absenteeism, such as Green et al. (2013) and Wang and Gupta (2014) . However, our self-scheduling stang context is dierent because agents self-schedule to dierent shifts from a single pool, based on their availabilities and preferences, whereas each clinical unit may be staed separately. This paper is related to research on delay announcements, including Armony et al. (2009 ), Jouini et al. (2011 , Allon and Bassamboo (2011) , Aksin et al. (2016) , and Yu et al. (2016) . However, none of these papers considers multiple shifts, nor the joint stang and announcement problem which arises in a context with self-scheduling servers. This paper is most closely related to recent papers on queues with a self-scheduling capacity. The paper closest to ours is Gurvich et al. (2017) , who were the rst to study the operational management of systems with self-scheduling agents. They consider a prot-maximizing rm which can control the pool size, the compensation, as well as place a cap on agent participation in overstaed shifts. In contrast, we focus here on minimizing costs when quality of service is important and customers are impatient. Modelling system congestion and customer impatience allows us to analyze a customer-side control instead, i.e., the announcements. More generally, there is a growing stream of literature on the management of on-demand service platforms (see for example Ozkan and Ward (2017), Hu and Zhou (2017b) , Braverman et al. (2017) , Taylor (2017), Cachon et al. (2016) , Riquelme et al. (2016) , Tang et al. (2017) , Bimpikis et al. (2017) , Hu and Zhou (2017a,b) , Feng et al. (2017), Hu and , etc.). Our paper is related to that stream of literature, but our focus on stang queues with randomness in capacity, and focusing on the role of customer impatience, are dierent. Ata et al. (2017) is also relevant to our work, albeit in a dierent application context (volunteer gleaning operations), and with a dierent focus.
Modelling Framework
In this section, we describe our modelling framework: First, we describe our queueing framework, and then we formulate the optimization problem faced by the system manager.
Queueing Model. There are k shifts and we consider single-class G/G/N n j +GI queueing models in steady state, where j indexes the shift and N n j is a random variable which depends on the pool size n. As in Gurvich et al. (2017) , we assume that agents are statistically identical and have an availability threshold (opportunity cost) T for showing up in shift j. Letting G(·) denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf ) of T , an agent shows up in shift j with probability r j ≡ G(c j ).
In particular, E[N n j ] = nr j is the expected number of servers in shift j. We assume that G(·) is log-concave with positive density function g(·). We emphasize that there we make no restriction on whether the agent may appear in multiple and/or successive shifts. Service times are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with a general distribution and mean 1/µ. We assume, without loss of generality, that µ = 1.
Each customer will abandon if he is unable to start service before a random amount of time, which we refer to as his patience time. Patience times are i.i.d. across customers, and have a cdf F , complementary cdf (ccdf )F , density function f , hazard-rate function h a , and mean 1/θ for some θ > 0. Abandonment makes the system stable, even when N n j is random (Whitt 2006b) 9 .
Customers arrive to the system according to general stationary processes with rates λ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
9 Specically, with abandonment and a deterministic N , a proper steady-state distribution always should exist. Stability with a random N follows by conditioning and unconditioning on N .
We assume that there is no service overlap between the dierent shifts, i.e., customers who arrive during a shift must be served by agents who are assigned to that shift. While this assumption may not always be justiable, it is reasonable when the system is suciently large. The arrival, service, and abandonment processes are all mutually independent, also independent of N n j . There is unlimited waiting space, and we use the rst-come-rst-served service discipline. System Manager's Problem. As in , we consider two qualityof-service costs, indexed by the shift j: (i) A delay cost, h j , per customer for each unit of time that this customer spends waiting to be served, and (ii) an abandonment penalty cost, p j , incurred per customer who abandons before being served. Let Q N n j denote the steady-state queue length and α N n j denote the net customer abandonment rate. The system manager can decide on both the stang level n and the compensation to oer her agents. Because of erce competition between alternative service providers, and because of mounting pressure to oer a suciently high compensation 10 to agents in on-demand service platforms, we assume that there exists a minimum wage, l, i.e., that we must have c j ≥ l in every shift j . Here is the manager's problem:
where c ≡ (c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c k ) is the k-dimensional vector of compensations and N denotes the set of natural integers. We note in passing that the formulation in (3.1) is a cost formulation, i.e., the objective is to minimize the expected cost in the system. An alternative formulation would be to consider a constraint formulation instead, e.g., to impose a service-level constraint on the waitingtime. This distinction is carefully treated in Bum Soh and Gurvich (2017) who explore the duality between the two formulations in both single-class and multi-class queues. They nd that while the optimal trade-o of capacity and delay can be implemented via a stang problem with average waiting constraints in a single-class setting, the problem is more complicated with multiple classes where a priority scheme must be implemented as well.
Since the problem in (3.1) is not amenable to exact analysis, we consider a steady-state uid approximation of the system instead. For an G/G/s + GI system,q ρs andᾱ ρs are, respectively, the uid approximations for the queue-length and net abandonment rates with trac intensity 10 http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-28/uber-out-drivers-sue-sharing-economy-champion-minimum-wage ρ s ≡ λ/sµ. The uid approximation to problem (3.1) is:
where E[N n j ] = nG(c j ). In 7, we establish the asymptotic accuracy of our uid approximation and quantify the orders of magnitude of the resulting errors, depending on the prescribed asymptotic regime, when the number of servers has a binomial distribution. There, we show that our uid approximation is extremely accurate, particularly when the system is heavily congested.
Under the uid approximation in (3.2), only the expected number of agents who show up in a given shift, e.g., based on the oered compensation, matters. In reality, the variance in the number of agents who show up is also important to consider, as it could considerably impact performance measures in the system. For example, larger agent pools may also entail higher variance which must be planned for by the system manager. In this paper, we do not address that issue further as our main goal is to derive insights on how to manage such systems using both short-term (compensation, announcements) and long-term (stang) controls. We study the impact of the variance in capacity on the operational management of the system in a follow-up paper, Dong and Ibrahim (2017) .
Long-Term Stang Policy
In this section, we solve the long-term stang problem with self-scheduling servers. Here, we x c in (3.1) and focus on determining the capacity n directly as a function of r j = G(c j ). Later, we solve the manager's problem when she can jointly decide on all controls in her toolbox. Since we are particularly interested in describing the role played by the abandonment distribution, and in order to ground our theoretical analysis in common practice, we begin by highlighting some empirical ndings on how customers abandon in real-life service systems.
How Do Customers Abandon in Practice?
Using hazard rates to describe customer patience dates back to Palm (1953) , and is common in statistical inference studies on customer abandonment; e.g., see Brown et al. (2005) . Mandelbaum and Zeltyn (2013) also advocate the usage of survival functions for patience inference.
Existing empirical evidence, from both the call center and healthcare settings, suggests that customers typically have an abandonment distribution with a decreasing hazard rate. In a call center setting, Mandelbaum and Zeltyn (2013) nd that customers who have already waited for a signicant time, tend to remain increasingly patient (p. 14). In an emergency department setting, Bolandifar et al. (2016) also reach the conclusion that the abandonment distribution of patients has a decreasing hazard rate, and attribute this to the sunk cost eect (p. 19) . In what follows, we consider abandonment distributions with both increasing and decreasing hazard rates, and determine the optimal stang policy in each case. Later, we formulate stochastic order relations between abandonment distributions using both survival functions and hazard rates, and study the impact of those relations on the cost in the system.
Benchmark Case: No Self-Scheduling
Without self-scheduling, the system manager can independently select the optimal stang levels, n * j in each shift j. However, with self-scheduling, she can only choose the total stang level, n * , and allow agents in the pool of size n * to self schedule.
The density of the uid that has been waiting for exactly u time units, in shift j, is equal to λ jF (u). Therefore, the corresponding (unscaled) queue length is given by q j =
where w j denotes the waiting time given service. The net abandonment rate (unscaled) in shift j is equal to λ j F (w j ). In the absence of self-scheduling, we must have that n * j = λ jF (w * j ) ≤ λ j where w * j is the optimal waiting time in shift j; indeed, it is then suboptimal to sta more than λ j agents in shift j. The uid approximation to the system manager's problem for shift j is:
Hereafter, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1 states that stang costs are suciently inexpensive; this is consistent with the assumptions in . Then, it is easy to establish the following result for the optimal solution to problem (4.3).
Proposition 4.1. Under Assumption 4.1, in a system with no self-scheduling servers, it is optimal to match the supply and demand rates in every shift, i.e., n * j = λ j .
Proposition 4.1 shows that, in a system without self-scheduling, it is optimal to operate every shift in the critically-loaded regime (Haln and Whitt 1981) . Thus, all customers are served immediately upon arrival, and there is no reneging from the system. Intuitively, when the stang costs are small enough (less than the upper bound in the assumption), it is cost eective for the manager to sta a large enough agent pool to eliminate, at uid scale, all congestion from her system. In contrast, if the stang costs are high, then it would be cost eective to allow for congestion instead, i.e., purposely deteriorate the service level because stang enough agents is too costly.
Self-Scheduling Capacity
We dene the augmented arrival rate Γ j ≡ λ j /r j , and let Γ 0 ≡ 0. Dening the augmented demand rates as such allows us to capture the salient heterogeneity across shifts, which is the key challenge in managing a random capacity. That heterogeneity is due to two factors: (i) time-dependent demand λ i and (ii) time-dependent availabilities of agents r i . Without loss of generality, we assume that the alternative shifts are numbered in order of increasing Γ j values, i.e., Γ j−1 ≤ Γ j for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}. In other words, we re-index the dierent shifts so that the Γ i values are ordered.
That is, if Γ 1 > Γ 2 and there are only two periods, we re-index shift 1 as shift 2, and vice-versa.
For a total stang level Γ j−1 < n < Γ j , all shifts with index i where i ≤ j − 1 are underloaded, whereas all shifts where i ≥ j are overloaded. Moreover, letting n = Γ j amounts to matching the supply and demand rates in shift j. In an overloaded shift i, we have that Γ iF (w i ) = n, i.e.,
Since it is never optimal to strictly underload all shifts, the system manager's problem can be dened piecewise over the successive [Γ j−1 , Γ j ) intervals as:
where 1(n ∈ A) denotes the indicator function over the set A, and u j (n) is given by:
i.e., u j (n) is the total cost incurred if n is chosen in the interval [Γ j−1 , Γ j ). In (4.4), for each value of n, exactly one of the indicator functions will be equal to 1 and the rest will be equal to 0. For
. That is, all shifts which are indexed i 0 and above will be congested and the manager incurs customer-related costs in those shifts, whereas the remaining shifts, indexed below i 0 , are overstaed (no congestion). We begin with the following proposition providing necessary and sucient conditions under which self-scheduling is not costly to the manager, relative to the benchmark.
Proposition 4.2. Self-scheduling is not costly to the system manager if, and only if, the resulting augmented arrival rates are identical across all shifts.
Proposition 4.2 highlights the importance of considering multiple shifts in our setting. Indeed, with a single shift, it is readily seen that the manager can simply sta a large enough agent pool, equal to λ/r, so as to eliminate the cost of self-scheduling in her system. It is because the manager is confronted with a self-scheduling capacity across multiple shifts that she has to pay a price for self-scheduling. Based on Proposition 4.2, if the manager is able to solicit her agents' scheduling preferences upon hire, then she should make stang decisions in a way to ensure demand-augmented uniform plans across shifts. For example, if the morning shift (M) typically experiences high demand while the afternoon shift (A) typically experiences low demand, i.e., λ M > λ A , then she should hire agents with a stronger preference for the morning shift, i.e., r M > r A so that Γ M = Γ A . By doing so, she could eliminate the cost of self-scheduling. The problem is, of course, that hiring agents based on their scheduling preferences is not usually possible in our context, e.g., with self-scheduling agents in virtual call centers. Instead, the manager may only have historical estimates of agent preferences, i.e., of the r j values, and of the resulting Γ j values, and know the cost structure in her system. Next, we investigate her stang problem when the augmented arrival rates are not uniform across shifts.
Monotonically Non-Decreasing Hazard Rate
For abandonment distributions with a monotonically increasing hazard rate or with exponential abandonment, we nd that it is optimal to match the supply and demand rates in one of the k shifts when servers self schedule (as opposed to all shifts when they do not self-schedule), with the remaining shifts being either over or under staed.
Proposition 4.3. For abandonment distributions with a monotonically non-decreasing hazard rate:
• The objective function in problem (4.4) is piecewise concave (piecewise linear with exponential);
• There is one shift i 0 where the supply and demand rates must be matched, i.e., n * = Γ i 0 ;
• With exponential abandonment, i 0 must satisfy the following condition where
(4.6) Proposition 4.3 shows that solving the stang problem in this case reduces to determining which of the k shifts to critically load. For example, with exponential abandonment, the condition in (4.6) can be interpreted as follows. Starting with a stang level equal to 0, a unit increase in the stang level increases the expected stang cost by k j=1 c j r j . It also decreases the expected congestion cost by k j=1 L j r j . Under Assumption 4.1, adding one server to an empty pool will yield an overall cost decrease in the system, since Condition (4.6) states that the manager must continue increasing the stang level until the rate of decrease in congestion costs no longer osets the rate of increase in stang costs: The supply and demand rates in shift i 0 are then matched. The optimality of overstang certain shifts lends some support to the stang policies adopted in virtual call centers such as LiveOps 11 or Arise 12 , where agents regularly complain about the fact that there are too many other agents on board and, consequently, too few calls to answer. However, the compensation structure in those settings is dierent: There, the manager typically uses volume-dependent pay, e.g., agents earn a piece-rate compensation in addition to some base salary. Under our xed compensation structure, we nd that overstang certain shifts can minimize costs, but that this is not true for all shifts.
To illustrate how the stang policy of Proposition 4.3 may be implemented in practice, we now discuss a simple example with three shifts: morning (M), early afternoon (EA), and (3) late afternoon (LA). Let us assume that λ LA < λ M < λ EA . That is, demand is highest in the early afternoon, followed by morning, and then late afternoon. Let us now compare two dierent patterns.
Under pattern 1, we assume that many agents show up in the morning, few in the early afternoon, and many again in the late afternoon. In particular, we assume that r EA < r LA < r M and that, as a result, we have Γ M < Γ LA < Γ EA . Recall that we re-index the shifts in order of increasing Γ i to 11 https://www.glassdoor.ie/Reviews/Employee-Review-LiveOps-RVW6931455.htm 12 https://www.glassdoor.co.uk/Reviews/Arise-technical-support-Reviews-EI-IE31617.0,5-PKH6,23.htm derive the optimal stang policy. Under pattern 1, since Γ EA is largest, it will be indexed as the third shift. Thus, the shifts are re-indexed as: 1: M, 2: LA, and 3: EA.
Let us now consider another pattern. Under pattern 2, let us assume that few agents show up in the morning, many show up in the early afternoon, and then few in the late afternoon. In particular, r M < r LA < r EA . Let us also assume that we then obtain Γ EA < Γ M < Γ LA . The shifts are now indexed as 1: EA, 2: M, and 3: LA. That is, even though the early afternoon shift has the highest demand, it has the lowest Γ value since many agents show up for that shift. Since the stang policy in Proposition 4.3 depends on both the indexing of the shifts and the cost structure, we may have dierent stang prescriptions under patterns 1 and 2. For example, the morning shift may be overstaed under pattern 1, and understaed under pattern 2.
Monotonically Decreasing Hazard Rate
We now consider abandonment distributions with a monotonically decreasing hazard rate, which is consistent with the way call center customers abandon in practice (4.1).
Proposition 4.4. For abandonment distributions with a monotonically decreasing hazard rate:
• The objective function in problem (4.4) is piecewise convex;
, it is optimal to either under or over sta every shift (no matching). Otherwise, it is optimal to match the supply and demand rates in one of the shifts.
Interestingly, Proposition 4.4 shows that it may be optimal for the manager to not match the supply and demand rates anywhere, i.e., to eectively under or over load every shift. In the appendix, we derive a sucient condition on the augmented arrival rates for this to be the case (in the proof of the proposition). At a high level, this sucient condition shows that if the imbalance between the augmented arrival rates, measured by Γ i 0 −1 /Γ i 0 , is small enough then it may be optimal to strike a balance between the two shifts i 0 − 1 and i 0 , i.e., to underload shift i 0 − 1, while overloading shift i 0 . This result is dierent from, e.g., the result in Wang and Gupta (2014) who study the nurse stang problem with absenteeism and show, under a similar rst-order approximation as ours, that assignments must match average supply to mean demand (p. 440) in each shift. Indeed, the main dierence between our setting and theirs is that agents self-schedule from a single pool, whereas there are distinct pools associated with clinical units, and each may be staed separately.
In practical terms, Proposition 4.4 shows that it may be optimal for the manager to maintain an imbalance between the average supply and demand rates in each of the shifts. In other words, having just the right number of sta available within each interval of the day to meet established service levels 13 , which is conventional wisdom for workforce management in call centers, may no longer be the right approach with self-scheduling agents, since it may be optimal not to meet the established service level in any shift, but rather to exceed or fall below it.
4.6
Numerical Example
We now turn to illustrating the impact of the abandonment distribution on the system's cost. In Figures 1 and 2 , we solve the stang problems without and with self-scheduling, respectively, for a Weibull abandonment distribution with xed mean (equal to 1) and alternative values of the shape parameter, s. Considering Weibull abandonment is convenient because its hazard rate has dierent monotonicities depending on the value of s: For s < 1, it is decreasing (DFR), for s > 1 it is increasing (IFR), and for s = 1 it is constant. Other parameters are held constant across the two gures, in particular we consider k = 5 shifts, and assume equal cost parameters across all shifts: c = 0.8, h = 0.8, p = 1. We also let r = 0.4. We let the average arrival rate be equal to 55, and assume equal increments in the arrival rates across the shifts, i.e., λ i+1 − λ i is constant for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. We assume that λ max /λ min = 5, so that the shift with the highest arrival rate has an arrival rate which is 5 times larger than the shift with the smallest arrival rate. Figure 1 illustrates that the abandonment distribution plays no role without self scheduling, since the optimal stang cost is constant, and there is no congestion anywhere. In contrast, Figure 2 shows that, while self-scheduling is always costly, the cost of self scheduling itself depends on the specic shape of the abandonment distribution. Figure 2 suggests that if two abandonment distributions have the same mean, a distribution with a decreasing hazard rate yields a smaller cost than one with an increasing hazard rate. We demonstrate this, along with other properties, next. 
Stochastic Order Relations
We now study the impact of various stochastic order relations, between abandonment distributions, on the system's cost; for background, see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) . Let X 1 and X 2 denote two generic times to abandon random variables, with cumulative distributive functions F 1 , F 2 and hazard functions h a1 , h a2 , respectively. Let C * i denote the optimal cost under abandonment distribution i, i.e., C * i is the optimal objective value in (3.2), for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 4.5.
• Under equal mean times to abandon, if h a1 is decreasing and h a2 is increasing, then C * 1 ≤ C * 2 ;
• Under equal mean times to abandon, if X 1 is new worse than used in expectation (NWUE) and X 2 is new better than used in expectation (NBUE) 14 , then C * 1 ≤ C * 2 ;
• If X 1 ≤ st X 2 (rst-order stochastic dominance), X 1 ≤ LR X 2 (likelihood ratio order), X 1 ≤ HR X 2 (hazard rate order), or X 1 ≤ RHR X 2 (reverse hazard rate order), then C * 1 ≤ C * 2 .
We begin by noting that the results in Proposition 4.5 apply generally to any congested system; since self-scheduling creates understaed shifts, they apply to our specic context as well. Proposition 4.5 14 A nonnegative random variable X is said to be NWUE (NBUE) if
provides a theoretical justication for the observations made in Figure 2 : assuming equal mean times to abandon, the Weibull distribution has a decreasing hazard rate when s < 1, and an increasing hazard rate when s > 1; thus, the cost of self scheduling must be smaller for s < 1. Intuitively, with a decreasing hazard rate, waiting customers are impatient initially and become increasingly patient with time. This leads to a reduction in the average waiting time for all uid in the system and, consequently, reduces the cost of self-scheduling. In contrast, with an increasing hazard rate, customers grow increasingly impatient with time, but are more patient initially. This leads to an increase in the overall average waiting time for all uid in the system. The same intuition holds when one of the two distributions is NBUE, while the other is NWUE.
When X 1 and X 2 are ordered in a rst-order stochastic dominance sense, we can derive a stronger result: Then, the uid waiting time given service, waiting time given abandonment, and overall waiting time can all be shown to be smaller with abandonment distribution F 1 than with F 2 . As a result, the system's cost is also smaller. Since likelihood ratio, hazard rate, and reverse hazard rate dominance all imply rst-order stochastic dominance, the same holds under those types of stochastic orders as well.
Controlling Customers: Delay Announcements
Our analysis so far has focused on emphasizing the role played by the customer abandonment distribution in a system with randomness in capacity. Because of this, it is natural to investigate ways of controlling this abandonment behaviour so as to alleviate the system's cost. We now propose to do so via delay announcements in the system. In this section, we rst explore the impact of the announcements by assuming that both n and c j are xed. The manager may also have updated demand-rate forecasts at her disposal, based on which she would make a decision on whether or not to make announcements. In that sense, the announcements are viewed as a real-time control that is decided upon in a short-time scale. Then, we study a joint stang and announcement problem.
How Do Customers React to Delay Announcements in Practice?
We begin by highlighting empirical evidence describing how customers react to delay announcements in practice. That evidence will subsequently guide us in modelling customer response to the announcements. Based on their analysis of call-center data, Mandelbaum and Zeltyn (2013) found that customers who are promised a short wait become impatient at some point and customers with the longest estimated wait seem to be relatively impatient (p. 22). This evidence suggests that customers grow increasingly impatient with the magnitude of the announced delay, i.e., that their mean time to abandon is decreasing in the announced delay. Similarly, Aksin et al. (2016) found that callers who receive information that the queue length is long abandon the system sooner and callers who receive information that the queue length is short abandon the system later compared to the case with no information. (p. 31). Thus, delay announcements incite customers to abandon sooner, thereby reducing congestion in the system. Consistently, we make here the assumption that the mean time to abandon decreases with the magnitude of the announced delay.
The All-Exponential Model
Because we consider a system with multiple shifts, and dierent shifts have dierent congestion levels and therefore dierent delay announcements, we obtain in each shift a dierent announcementdependent abandonment distribution. Herein lies the complexity of considering multiple shifts: The announcements may lead to shorter delays in some shifts, but not in others, and the aggregate eect of those announcements is unclear.
To derive insights on system performance, we focus hereafter on an exponential abandonment distribution with an announcement-dependent rate. In particular, letting w be the announcement made, customers abandon according to an exponential abandonment distribution with rate θ(w).
We begin by noting that if the stang level is xed, then delay announcements cannot be used to completely eliminate the cost of self-scheduling in the system. This is because the rate of abandoning customers is unaected by the announcements (it is determined solely by the arrival and service completion rates). Thus, the abandonment cost does not decrease. On the other hand, the announcements can be used to control the overall waiting time in the system.
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibria
In this work, we contend that the announcements made must be truthful, for otherwise customers will learn to mistrust them. Since those announcements alter customer abandonment behavior which, in turn, aects the future announcements made, announcement accuracy in our uid ap-proximation reduces to investigating the existence of an equilibrium delay for which the waiting time of served customers coincides with the announcement made. Assume that the size of the agent pool is xed and equal to n. Then, n j = nG(c j ) is the number of agents available in shift j. We let w e j (n) denote the equilibrium delay in shift j, which is dependent on n. Then, we must have:
−w e j (n)θ(w e j (n)) = n j , i.e., e −w e j (n)θ(w e j (n)) = n Γ j ,
by conservation of ow in shift j. The total cost in the system, with the announcements, is
(5.8)
Assuming that θ(·) is continuous and strictly increasing, consistently with the empirical evidence in 5.1, guarantees the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium w e j (n) in every shift j. In what follows, we also assume that θ(w) is a dierentiable function of w and that lim w→∞ θ(w) > 0.
When Are the Announcements Eective?
We have dierent Γ j values and, consequently, dierent announcement-dependent abandonment rates given by (5.7). We now derive a simple sucient condition under which the announcements lead to an overall decrease in the system's cost, across all shifts. We let θ 0 denote the abandonment rate without the announcements, which is constant across all shifts. By Proposition 4.3, it is optimal to critically load one shift, call it i c , i.e., n * = Γ ic without the announcements.
Proposition 5.1. With exponential abandonment with an announcement-dependent rate θ(w), if 9) then C a (n * ) < C * for C a (·) in (5.8), where C * is the optimal solution to (3.2) with n * = Γ ic .
Proposition 5.1 shows that for C a (n * ) < C * to hold, and under our assumptions on θ(·), it suces to impose a condition on customer response at a single point only, namely at θ 0 , and only two shifts, i c and i c + 1: Only the augmented arrival rates in shifts i c and i c + 1 matter. The upper bound in (5.9) on θ 0 means that customers do not abandon too fast in the absence of announcements. Since Γ i c+1 /Γ ic measures the imbalance in augmented arrival rates, (5.9) shows that the announcements are eective for a larger set of θ 0 values as that imbalance increases. This is desirable, since this is precisely when we would like to control the system. Here is an alternative explanation for the condition in (5.9). By dividing both sides by θ 0 , and rewriting the right-hand-side as:
where w 0 ic+1 is the uid waiting time in period i c + 1 under abandonment rate θ 0 , we see that (5.9) can be interpreted as having a long waiting time, exceeding θ −1 (θ 0 ), in the absence of the announcements, in shift i c + 1. Making the delay announcement would then encourage customers to abandon, thereby alleviating congestion. In other words: If the waiting time is long enough in shift i c + 1, then make the delay announcement.
Since the announcements lead to a decrease in waiting times, it is natural to investigate whether it is optimal for the manager to create additional congestion by understang her system in the rst stage. The cost increase due to this congestion would subsequently be reduced by the announcements in the second stage. Next, we solve the manager's stang problem with delay announcements.
A New Stang Problem
The manager's stang problem, assuming that she makes announcements in the second stage, is:
where we replace the constant abandonment rate θ 0 by dierent announcement-dependent rates, θ(w e j (n)), depending on both the shift and the stang level n. That is, in setting her optimal stang level, the manager needs to consider the subsequent dependence of customer abandonment behavior on the selected pool size. Let n * a denote the optimal solution to (5.10) 15 , with the announcements, and n * denote the optimal solution to (3.2), without the announcements.
15 An optimal solution necessarily exists. If there are multiple optimal solutions, then we pick the smallest one.
Proposition 5.2. With exponential abandonment with an announcement-dependent rate θ(w), if 11) then n * a < n * .
That is, under (5.11), it is optimal for the manager to hire a smaller agent pool than without the announcements. This conclusion is consistent with Huang et al. (2017) , who consider a dierent optimization problem (they minimize the stang level subject to a quality-of-service constraint) in the context of a single shift with no self-scheduling. They, too, nd that the announcements may lead to understang. As such, we provide further evidence, in our new context, that management may indeed draw a dual benet from the delay announcement: rst, by reducing the waiting time of served customers and second, by reducing the stang level. While Proposition 5.2 provides a sucient condition for the system manager to understa her system, compared to the no-announcement case, it does not quantify the decrease in cost which results from this. We explore this question, and others, in a numerical study which we relegate to the appendix (?? there).
6 Optimizing Stang, Compensation, and the Announcements
In this section, we study how the manager may use all three controls in her toolbox, stang, compensation, and the announcements, to eectively manage her system. We focus on the case with exponential abandonment, and begin by studying how compensation and the announcements may be used as short-term controls for a xed stang level (6.1). Then, we study how stang, compensation, and the announcements may be jointly optimized (6.2).
Short-Term Controls: Compensation and Delay Announcements
Compensation. We assume that the stang level is equal to n, and investigate the optimal compensation to be oered in shift k. In practice, while the manager has to make the stang decision based on historical estimates of the arrival rates λ k , she may update the compensation in each shift based on some revised estimate of the arrival rate for that shift, e.g., because of additional information at her disposal. The problem for shift k is given by 16 :
(6.12)
For expositional ease, we let L k ≡ p k + h k /θ capture customer-related costs, and denote ψ n k ≡
This compensation incites just enough agents to meet demand in shift k. It will also be convenient to dene a k < L k as follows:
(6.13)
We note that (6.13) is the rst-order condition of the unconstrained optimization problem in (6.12), provided that n is such that n ≤ λ k /G(c k ); in other words, a k is the optimizer of that unconstrained optimization problem. The optimal compensation in problem (6.12) is given by the following lemma where we implicitly assume that l < a k ; we relax this assumption in the proof of Lemma 6.1, in the appendix.
Lemma 6.1. The optimal compensation in shift k, solution to (6.12), depends on n as follows:
, then c * k = ψ n k and demand and supply are matched in shift k;
Based on Lemma 6.1, we nd that the manager uses the minimum wage in shift k when the agent pool size is very large (case (a)). In this case, the manager need not use high compensation to incite sucient agent participation in the shift. For moderate values of the agent pool size (case (b)), the manager sets compensation to match demand and supply in the shift, i.e., c * k = ψ n k . Finally, when the pool size is very small (case (c)), inciting sucient agent participation is too costly for the manager, so she sets a compensation that leads to an understaed shift k. We note that the compensation oered to agents is monotonically decreasing in the agent pool size: the larger the pool, the smaller the compensation needed to incite agents to participate.
16 While the arrival rates may be revised, we retain the same notation, λ k , for simplicity.
Lemma 6.1 suggests that, even though the manager is able to utilize compensation as a control lever to incite agent participation, she need not use it to match demand and supply in a given shift.
In other words, surge pricing need not always be used to match supply and demand, as is the current viewpoint with e.g., ride-sharing platforms (The Economist 2016). Since excessive surges in prices usually generate bad press 17 , it is insightful that intentionally setting a lower price than needed to match supply and demand may be optimal. This also lends support to recent calls for ride-sharing services to set caps on the prices that they charge their customers, at the expense of potentially inciting fewer drivers to be on the road (Harvard Business Review 2015).
Delay announcements. For tractability, we assume that the announcement-dependent abandonment rate is constant and equal toθ > θ, where θ is the rate without the announcements. We
Thus, it is optimal for the manager to make announcements in every overloaded shift, since doing so would reduce the cost of congestion in that shift. While it is clear that making announcements is benecial to the manager in that case, it is unclear whether agents will be better or worse o because of the announcements. We now investigate this issue by investigating, for xed n, the optimal compensation in a shift where the manager is allowed to make delay announcements. Since the announcements are only relevant when the system is congested, we focus on case (c) in Lemma 6.1, i.e., we assume that n < λ k /G(a k )
for a k in (6.13). We letc * k denote the optimal compensation in shift k, assuming that the manager makes announcements in that shift; i.e.,c *
Lemma 6.2. If n < λ k /G(a k ) for a k in (6.13), thenc * k =ã k < c * k = a k where c * k is the optimal compensation for the no-announcement problem in (6.12) andã k is given by (6.14) i.e., agents are worse o because of the announcements.
Lemma 6.2 shows that a manager who uses the announcements to reduce congestion in her system would have less incentive to oer agents a higher compensation to induce their participation. Indeed, she uses the announcements to disincentivize customer waiting, thereby relieving congestion instead.
17 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-an-example-of-high-tech-gouging. html?_r=1
Jointly Optimizing All Controls
We now study the manager's problem when she can jointly optimize the stang level, the compensation oered to her agents, and whether or not to make announcements in any given shift. In the interest of analytical tractability, we continue to assume a constant abandonment rate in response to the announcements,θ > θ, so that the manager will make announcements in every congested shift. Here is the manager's problem:
where as beforeL j ≡ p j + h j /θ is the adjusted congestion cost which accounts for the eect of the announcements. To better position our results, we recall that when capping agents is allowed, the optimal compensation is set equal to the minimum wage in all shifts ),
irrespective of the value of that wage, and the stang level high enough to match demand in the highest-demand shift (with the oered minimum wage). In our context, we nd that this is no longer the case. Indeed, the optimal compensation depends on the value of the minimum wage, in particular whether it is low or high, the manager may oer higher compensation than the minimum wage in some shifts, and may still either understa or oversta some shifts. This lends support to recent practices in some sharing-economy platforms which set a minimum compensation to agents that is larger than the minimum wage, e.g., as for TaskRabbit 18 . We begin by establishing the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (6.15).
Existence and Uniqueness of the Solution to (6.15)
We have characterized the optimal solution for the compensation when the stang level is xed (Lemma 6.1). To solve problem (6.15), we can make use of the results of that lemma. Indeed, the 18 https://newrepublic.com/article/120378/wonolo-temp-worker-app-shows-scary-future-sharing-economy optimal agent pool size is the solution to the following problem:
whereã k is given in (6.14) and some intervals for n in (6.16) may be empty. Next, we show that there exists a unique solution to (6.16). Based on this optimal stang level and the optimal compensation in Lemma 6.1, we can derive the optimal solution to problem (6.15).
Lemma 6.3. The objective Π(n) in (6.16) is piecewise convex, and Π (n) is strictly increasing in n so that Π(n) is strictly convex in n. Thus, there exists a unique solution n * to (6.16). For that n * , the optimal compensation c * k for each shift k is given in Lemma 6.1.
In general, the solution to problem (6.16) is algebraically tedious to characterize in our multishift setting. To formulate meaningful insights, we focus next on two special cases: (i) when the minimum wage is suciently low, and (ii) when the minimum wage is suciently high.
Low Minimum Wage
We begin by considering the case where the minimum wage is suciently low. We dene:
whereã k is given in (6.14).
(6.17) Then, the following lemma holds for l < l 0 .
Lemma 6.4. If the minimum wage is suciently low, in particular l < l 0 in (6.17), then n * G(c * k ) ≥ λ k for all k, i.e., all shifts are either overstaed or have matched supply and demand. Moreover, there exists at least one shift i 0 where c * i 0 = G −1 (λ i 0 /n * ) > l where demand and supply are matched.
Lemma 6.4 shows that the manager need not always resort to using the announcements. In particular, if the minimum wage is low enough, then she will sta a large enough pool and oer high enough compensations so that, in every shift i, the supply n * G(c * i ) is at least as large as the demand λ i . Moreover, she will oer a compensation that is strictly higher than the minimum wage in at least one of the shifts (with highest demand rates). Intuitively, because the minimum wage is small, the manager is less restricted in the compensation that she has to pay her agents. Therefore, she can aord to sta a larger pool and eliminate congestion in her system. This also explains why she is then able to pay her agents a compensation which is strictly larger than the minimum wage.
Because no shift is congested, the manager does not resort to making delay announcements.
High Minimum Wage
We now explore the case where the minimum wage is suciently high. In particular, we assume thatã i < l <L i for all i. We now show that the manager would then make announcements.
Lemma 6.5. If the minimum wage is suciently high, l >l ≡ max 1≤i≤kãi whereã i is given in (6.14), then c * i = l for all i. Moreover, there exists a shift k 0 such that n * = λ k 0 /G(l), i.e., supply and demand are matched in shift k 0 . All shifts k for which λ k > λ k 0 are understaed, and all shifts for which λ k < λ k 0 are overstaed; announcements are made in every congested shift.
Lemma 6.5 shows that the manager must set compensation equal to the minimum wage in every shift, if that minimum wage is suciently high. In this case, the manager must sta a smaller agent pool (because it would be too costly to employ many agents), and she will use the announcements to alleviate congestion in understaed periods. The fact that the manager consistently compensates agents at the minimum wage and operates some shifts overloaded lends support to current practices in virtual call centers 19 where agent compensation is typically set at the minimum wage and there is congestion in shifts which experience peaks in customer demand.
Asymptotic Accuracy of the Fluid Approximation
In this section, we prove the asymptotic accuracy of the uid approximation in (3.2) with a binomially distributed number of servers; this distribution arises when the servers make independent decisions to join the dierent shifts. We also restrict attention to exponentially distributed service times, and a Poisson arrival process. Conditional on the number of servers in a shift, the queueing 19 https://www.thespruce.com/how-home-call-centers-pay-3542389 dynamics in dierent shifts are independent. Thus, to establish the desired asymptotic accuracy, it suces to focus on a single shift instead. The proof for multiple shifts can then be obtained by a simple argument, exploiting a similar conditioning argument as the one that we use in what follows, along with the conditional independence across shifts. In this section, for clarity of exposition, we consider a single-shift setting.
In this section, we prove the asymptotic accuracy of the uid approximation in (3.2) with a binomially distributed number of servers; this distribution arises when the servers make independent decisions to join the dierent shifts. We also restrict attention to exponentially distributed service times, and a Poisson arrival process. Conditional on the number of servers in a shift, the queueing dynamics in dierent shifts are independent. Thus, to establish the desired asymptotic accuracy, it suces to focus on a single shift instead. The proof for multiple shifts can then be obtained by a simple argument, exploiting a similar conditioning argument as the one that we use in what follows, along with the conditional independence across shifts. In this section, for clarity of exposition, we consider a single-shift setting.
We consider a sequence of queueing models indexed by the arrival rate λ, and study system performance as λ increases without bound. The number of servers in the λ th system is N λ ∼ Bin(n λ , r). We assume that ρ ≡ λ/E[N λ ] = λ/rn λ remains xed as λ increases. Let Q N λ denote the steady-state queue length and α N λ the net customer abandonment rate in the M/M/N λ + GI queue (abandonment makes the system stable). We refer to the cases with ρ > 1, ρ < 1, and ρ = 1 as the overloaded, underloaded, and critically loaded regimes, respectively. Since N λ is random, an M/M/N λ + GI system with e.g., ρ > 1 may or may not be overloaded, i.e., having λ > N λ . Theorem 7.1. Consider an M/M/N λ + GI queueing model with N λ ∼ Bin(n λ , r), (a) If ρ > 1 (overloaded regime), then there exists a nite constant K > 0 such that
Theorem 7.1 shows that, in the overloaded system, the uid approximation for the expected queue length is asymptotically accurate up to O(1) 20 , and the uid approximation for the net abandonment rate is asymptotically accurate up to o(1), i.e., the corresponding error is asymptotically bounded in the former case, and it decreases with the arrival rate in the latter case. In other words, uid approximations are extremely accurate in the overloaded regime. In the critically-loaded system, those uid-approximation errors are O( √ λ), i.e., they grow in the square-root of the size of the system. In the underloaded regime, uid approximations are o(1)-accurate since errors for both performance measures decrease with the arrival rate.
While our discussion in Theorem 7.1 is split according to the asymptotic regime prescribed, an alternative approach would be to resort to regime-free universal approximations, as in Gurvich et al. (2013) and Huang and Gurvich (2016) . Since such treatment lies outside the scope of this paper, we do not discuss this point further here. The following theorem establishes the asymptotic accuracy of uid-based stang prescriptions, by exploiting the results of Theorem 7.1; the proof proceeds along similar lines as Theorem 3 in Bassamboo and Randhawa (2010).
Theorem 7.2. The uid-based prescription, n * λ is asymptotically optimal in the overloaded, criticallyloaded and underloaded regimes in the sense that
where Π * λ is the optimal objective value for (3.1) and Π λ (n * λ ) is the value of its objective evaluated at n * λ . If, in addition, n * λ is such that the system is overloaded, then there exists K > 0 such that
20 Let f and g be two functions dened on some subset of R. Then, as n → ∞,
i.e., the uid stang prescription is asymptotically O(1)-accurate in the overloaded regime.
Intuitively, because the binomial random variable concentrates around its mean asymptotically, so that uctuations in the number of servers are asymptotically negligible, intuitions similar to those in , who consider a deterministic number of servers, continue to hold in our setting. In particular, in the overloaded case, stochastic uctuations are better explained by large deviations theory. Thus, uid approximations are practically indistinguishable from the estimates for, e.g., average queue-lengths. This translates into the O(1) accuracy for the uid-based stang prescriptions in Theorem 7.2. In the critically-loaded regime, stochastic uctuations are consistent with those suggested by the central limit theorem, i.e., they are on the order of √ λ. In other words, they are also asymptotically negligible since the magnitude of the optimal objective in our original problem is O(λ): This is because the stang cost is linear in the stang pool, and the stang pool size itself is O(λ); this is the rst part of Theorem 7.2. In the online supplement, we describe the results of some numerical experiments validating our asymptotic results.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the problem of stang and controlling large-scale service systems with a random number of servers. This randomness arises with strategic agent behavior, e.g., as with self-scheduling agents in virtual call centers. Our asymptotic accuracy results support the usefulness of uid approximations in this context. Because of congestion in understaed shifts, the customer abandonment distribution plays an important role. We characterized this role, and proposed using delay announcements as a control of customer abandonment behavior; this is especially useful in settings where other tools, such as pricing, cannot be used to inuence customers. We studied the optimization of three controls (stang, compensation, and the announcements), and found that the optimal control policy may be non-standard, in that it may be optimal to match supply and demand in one of the shifts, or to not do so in any shift, eectively understang and overstang all shifts.
This suggests that managers may need, in this new context, to shift from the traditional paradigm of workforce management, or from the current viewpoint dominating sharing-economy applications,
where it is believed that matching supply and demand, at least in rst order, is always desirable.
The current growth of the sharing economy has motivated several recent papers in the academic literature. Nevertheless, further exploration of the dynamics of such systems remains of interest for future research. In this paper, we explored the stang and control question using a uid approximation. There remains to establish supporting many-server heavy-trac limits for dierent stochastic processes in the system, such as the queue length (corresponding to a functional law of large numbers). Such an investigation would lead to a deeper understanding of the system's dynamics. Several modelling extensions (multiplicity of customer classes, time-variability in the demand rates, etc.) remain to be explored. Finally, alternative system design questions, e.g., optimal priority rules when both the available capacity and incoming demand are random, as is the case with two-sided platforms in the sharing economy, would be interesting to explore as well.
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Angeles, working paper. We begin by establishing the asymptotic O(1)-accuracy for the expected queue length. Let 0 < < r and dene k 1 ≡ r − and k 2 ≡ r + . Assume that is small enough so that ρr/(r + )
where Q s is the steady-state queue length in the corresponding M/M/s+GI queue with the same arrival rate.
Conditioning and unconditioning on N λ . Conditioning on N λ , we can write:
We now turn to establishing asymptotic bounds for A λ and B λ , dened as follows:
Asymptotic bound for N λ far from n λ r. We begin by showing that A λ is asymptotically negligible.
Lemma 10.1. lim λ→∞ A λ = 0.
Proof. We can write,
Also, dene A
(1)
λ ≡ s>k 2 n λ or s<k 1 n λ sq ρ P(N λ = s). Note that Q 0 has the same distribution as the steady-state number in the system in an M/GI/∞ model with Poisson arrivals at rate λ = rn λ ρ and i.i.d. generally distributed service times having the same distribution, F , as the abandonment times in our original model. Therefore, exploiting standard results for the innite-server queue, Q 0 has a Poisson distribution with mean λ/θ = rn λ ρ/θ, i.e., E[Q 0 ] = O(λ). Applying Hoeding's inequality to the binomial distribution:
We now turn to showing that A (2) λ is asymptotically negligible as well. Note that:
where 1{·} denotes an indicator random variable. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
λ → 0 as λ → ∞. Combining the above, we obtain that A λ → 0 as well.
Asymptotic bound for N λ close to n λ r. We now characterize B λ for large λ. Lemma 10.2. There exists a nite constant C > 0 such that lim sup λ→∞ B λ ≤ C.
Proof. We begin by writing B λ as follows,
where ρ s ≡ n λ rρ/s andq ρs is the uid limit for the queue length in the M/M/s + GI queue with trac intensity ρ s (the arrival rate is λ = rn λ ρ and the number of servers is s). Let,
First, we consider B
(1) λ and show that it is asymptotically bounded. Fix n λ and note that to each k 1 n λ ≤ s ≤ k 2 n λ corresponds a trac intensity ρ s in the M/M/s + GI system, where ρ s = n λ rρ/s and 1 < ρr/(r + ) ≤ ρ s ≤ ρr/(r − ). By Theorem 5 of , assuming that f is strictly positive and continuously dierentiable, (10.19) wherew ρs is the uid limit for the steady-state waiting time in the overloaded M/M/s + GI queue with trac intensity ρ s . Note that for ρr/(r + ) ≤ ρ s ≤ ρr/(r − ), we have thatw ρr/(r+ ) ≤w ρs ≤ w ρr/(r− ) . By the continuity of the bounding function in (10.19) and the boundedness theorem, we conclude that there exists a nite constant C 1 > 0 such that
(10.20)
Since B
(1) combining (10.19) and (10.20) yields that lim sup λ→∞ B
(1) λ ≤ C 1 by taking limits on both sides. There remains to study the asymptotic behaviour of B (2) λ . Note that q ρs = ρ s (F ) −1 (1/ρs) 0F (u) du, e.g., by equations (3.6) and (3.7) in Whitt (2006a) . Consider,
We now show that there must exist a nite constant C 2 > 0 such that
for λ large enough. To this aim, dene the function
For a given λ, we use a Taylor-series expansion of E[g λ (N λ )] around E[N λ ] = n λ r (we can do this since g λ is suciently dierentiable and the moments of N λ are nite):
Indeed, by computing the centralized moments of N λ and higher-order derivatives of g λ , it can be shown that the remainder term in the Taylor series is O(1/λ). Also, g λ (n λ r) = 0 and
, where h 1 (ρ) = f (F −1 (1/ρ)) and h 2 (ρ) = f (F −1 (1/ρ)). Thus, there exists C 2 > 0 such that:
We now turn to the asymptotic behaviour of B
(2) λ . Note that:
Bounding the second term in the last equality, The proof for the net abandonment rate proceeds along similar lines, so we will be brief. Paralleling (10.19), and denoting E[α N λ |N λ = s] ≡ E[α s ], we can exploit Theorem 5 in to show that Whitt (2006a) :ᾱ ρs = ρ s − 1; thus, s(ᾱ ρs −ᾱ ρ ) = ρ(n λ r − s). We can then write:
10.2
The Underloaded Regime Let 0 < < r be small enough so that ρr/(r − ) < 1, and recall that k 1 ≡ r − and k 2 ≡ r + . Then, conditioning on N λ :
As in the proof of Theorem 7.1, we can show that:
is the expected steady-state queue length in an underloaded queue, it converges to 0 as λ → ∞, e.g, see Theorem 5.1 in Zeltyn and Mandelbaum (2005) . The limit for the net abandonment follows similarly.
10.3
The Critically-Loaded Regime
We condition on N λ : (10.21) where ρ s = rρn λ /s. Paralleling (10.19) and (10.20) , we can show that there exists a nite constant C 1 such that for large λ:
Using arguments as in Theorem 7.1 (noting e.g., that g λ (n λ r) =
0F (x)dx = 0), we can show that there exists a nite C 2 > 0 such that
By Theorem 4.1 of Zeltyn and Mandelbaum (2005) , there exists K > 0 such that E[Q n λ r ] ≤ K √ λ for large enough λ. Given that n λ r<s≤k 2 n λ E[Q s ]P(N λ = s) → 0 as λ → ∞ (underloaded regime), we obtain that the entire expression in (10.21) is O( √ λ). The proof for the abandonment rate follows along similar lines, so we omit the relevant details.
Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 4.2 If Γ i ≡ Γ, then letting n * = Γ yields n * i = λ i in each shift i. Thus, there is no congestion anywhere, and the overall cost C(n * ) = k j=1 λ i , which is the optimal benchmark cost.
Proposition 4.3 If the abandonment distribution is exponential, then for
Clearly, under condition (4.6), C(n) is piecewise linear with piecewise negative slopes for n ≤ Γ i 0 , and strictly positive slopes for n > Γ i 0 .
With a monotonically increasing hazard rate, we have
which is strictly decreasing in n, i.e., u i (n) < 0. Thus, the objective is piecewise strictly concave. The minimum must be achieved at some Γ i , at which we critically load shift i . Proposition 4.4 In [Γ i−1 , Γ i ), u i (n) is as in the proof of Proposition 4.3, so that u i (n) > 0 and the function is piecewise convex. It also follows that u i (n 1 ) < u i+1 (n 2 ) for n 1 ∈ [Γ i , Γ i+1 ) and n 2 ∈ [Γ i+1 , Γ i+2 ). In other words, if C (x) > 0, then C (y) > 0 for y ≥ x. Thus, the minimum n * will be at the interior of an interval (Γ i 0 −1 , Γ i 0 ) if u i 0 (Γ i 0 −1 ) < 0 and u i 0 (Γ i 0 −) > 0. Here is a sucient condition for this to be the case. Sucient condition. There exists i 0 , β, γ > 0 such that:
To see why this implies an interior point solution, note that:
< 0 by assumption.
Furthermore,
Combining both, we get that u i 0 (Γ i 0 −1 ) < 0 and u i 0 (Γ
) > 0 which, combined with the fact that C (·) increases across intervals, implies that the minimizer must lie strictly in the interval (Γ i 0 −1 , Γ i 0 ). In words, if the imbalance between the augmented arrival rates Γ i 0 /Γ i 0 +1 is small enough, it is optimal to strike a balance between the two shifts, i.e., underloading a shift, while overloading the other. 0F 2 (u)du so that u 1 j (n) ≤ u 2 j (n) for every n xed. In particular, this holds at optimal n * .
• For every a ≥ 0, we have that m 1 (a) = E[X 1 − a|X 1 > a] ≥ E[X 1 ] = E[X 2 ] ≥ E[X 2 − a|X 2 > a] = m 2 (a). Writing the objective as in part 1 of the proposition, and proceeding similarly, yields that the expected cost under the NWUE abandonment distribution is lower.
• With rst-order stochastic dominance, since Γ iF (w l i ) = 1 under both distributions, we must have that w 1 i ≤ w 2 i for all i (if n is xed). Thus,
0F 2 (x)dx for all i under each xed n, and we must have C * 1 ≤ C * 2 . The remaining stochastic order relations all imply rst-order stochastic dominance, so the same holds under each as well.
Proposition 5.1. For convenience, we drop the dependence of w e on n. It suces to show that θ(w e i+1 (Γ ic )) > θ 0 for i ≥ i c . To see this, note that: λ i+1 e −w e i+1 θ(w e i+1 ) = Γ ic r i+1 . This implies: e −w e i+1 θ(w e i+1 ) = Γ ic /Γ i+1 , for i ≥ i c , i.e., w e i+1 θ(w e i+1 ) = ln
. Then, θ 0 · θ −1 (θ 0 ) < w e i+1 θ(w e i+1 ) for i ≥ i c since Γ ic+1 ≤ Γ i+1 for i ≥ i c . Since xθ −1 (x) is increasing in x, we obtain that w e i+1 > θ −1 (θ 0 ), which implies that θ(w e i+1 ) > θ 0 for i ≥ i c , as desired. Then, C a (Γ ic ) < C(Γ ic ) = C * , and we get strict reduction in cost due to the announcements.
Lemma 6.1. We derive the optimal compensation for a xed value of the pool size n. Since c * i can be decided upon separately for each shift, we focus on a single shift setting in what follows, i.e., we x the shift i. The solution depends on the specic value of n.
: c * i = l, i.e., oer minimum wage and oversta shift i (under-loaded).
n < λ i G(l)
. Note that we must have that λ i ≥ nG(c i ) i.e., c i ≤ G −1 λ i n because it will not be cost eective for the manager to incite more supply than the demand in the shift.
Subcase 1: We assume that L i ≤ l. In this case, the problem becomes:
which is equivalent to
Since c i > L i , it is readily seen that the objective is increasing in c i . Thus, we must have that c * i = l. That is, we oer minimum wage and understa shift i (over-loaded).
Subcase 2: We now assume that L i > l. In this case,
. We then consider the two intervals: (a) n ≤
. The problem is now:
which is equivalent to solving:
. In this case, we have L i ≤ G −1 λ i n . Since t (L i ) ≥ 0, and t i (·) is convex under log-concavity of G, we obtain that:
i. If t i (l) < 0 i.e., 1 + (l − L i ) g(l)
G(l) < 0, then there exists an optimal c * i = a i ∈ (l, L i ) where t (a i ) = 0;
ii. If t i (l) ≥ 0 i.e., 1 + (l − L i ) g(l)
G(l) ≥ 0, then we have c * i = l.
In both cases (i) and (ii), the system is overloaded, i.e., the manager incites a smaller supply than the demand in shift i.
(b) Now, consider:
. Let 0 < a i < L i be such that t i (a i ) = 0 i.e.,
G(a
The optimization problem is
Note that if a i < l, then c * i = l (by the convexity of the objective); in other words, the manager oers the minimum wage and runs shift i overloaded. Now, assume that a i ≥ l.
We then have the following two cases:
. In this case, c * i = G −1 λ i n which means that the manager incites a supply equal to the demand, i.e., she critically loads her shift.
ii. t G −1 λ i n > 0 i.e., G −1 λ i n > a i i.e.,
. In this case, c * i = a i and the manager incites a supply that is smaller than the demand, i.e., she overloads her shift.
Lemma 6.2. We letã k be the solution to (6.14). Then,t (x) ≡ G(
is increasing for x ≤L k by the log-concavity of G(·). If a k >L k , then it must be that a k >ã k sincẽ a k <L k . Let us now assume that a k ≤L k . SinceL k < L k , we must have that
Becauset (x) is increasing in x for x ≤L k , and we have both a k ,ã k ≤L k , we also obtain that a k >ã k . If n < λ k /G(a k ), then we must also have that n < λ k /G(ã k ), so that the optimal compensation as per Lemma 6.1 is to setc * k =ã k < c * k = a k . We note that if n is as in cases (a) and (b) of Lemma 6.1, then the compensation oered to agents is unchanged since compensation is
